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ver-the-counter (OTC) interest rate derivatives include instruments
such as forward rate agreements (FRAs), interest rate swaps, caps,
ﬂoors, and collars. Broadly deﬁned, a derivative instrument is a for-
mal agreement between two parties specifying the exchange of cash payments
based on changes in the price of a speciﬁed underlying item or differences in
the returns to different securities. Like exchange-traded interest rate derivatives
such as interest rate futures and futures options, OTC interest rate derivatives
set terms for the exchange of cash payments based on changes in market in-
terest rates. An FRA is a forward contract that sets terms for the exchange
of cash payments based on changes in the London Interbank Offered Rate
(LIBOR); interest rate swaps provide for the exchange of payments based on
differences between two different interest rates; and interest rate caps, ﬂoors,
and collars are option-like agreements that require one party to make payments
to the other when a stipulated interest rate, most often a speciﬁed maturity of
LIBOR, moves outside of some predetermined range.
The over-the-counter market differs from futures markets in a number
of important respects. Whereas futures and futures options are standardized
The author beneﬁted from conversations with the following individuals: Keith Amburgey of
the International Swap Dealers Association, Inc., Albert Bashawaty of Morgan Guarantee
Trust Company, Richard Cohen of Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., Steen Parsholt of Citibank,
N.A., David E. Schwartz and Robert J. Schwartz of Mitsubishi Capital Market Services,
Inc., and Robert M. Spielman of Chase Manhattan Bank. Timothy Cook, Bob LaRoche, John
Walter, and John Weinberg read earlier drafts of this article and made many helpful editorial
suggestions. Any remaining errors or omissions are the sole responsibility of the author.
Opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reﬂect those of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly Volume 79/3 Summer 1993 65   
66 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
agreements that trade on organized exchanges, the over-the-counter market is
an informal market consisting of dealers, or market makers, who trade price in-
formation and negotiate transactions over electronic communications networks.
Although a great deal of contract standardization exists in the over-the-counter
market, dealers active in this market custom-tailor agreements to meet the
speciﬁc needs of their customers. And unlike futures markets, where futures ex-
change clearinghouses guarantee contract performance through a system of mar-
gin requirements combined with the daily settlement of gains or losses, coun-
terparties to OTC derivative agreements must bear some default or credit risk.
The rapid growth and energized pace of innovation in the market for in-
terest rate derivatives since 1981, the date of the ﬁrst widely publicized swap
agreement, has proven truly phenomenal. The advent of trading in interest
rate swaps was soon followed by FRAs, caps, ﬂoors, collars, as well as other
hybrid instruments such as forward swaps, options on swaps (swaptions), and
even options on options (captions).
This article offers an introduction to OTC interest rate derivatives. The ﬁrst
ﬁve sections describe some of the most common types of OTC derivatives:
FRAs, interest rate swaps, caps, ﬂoors, and collars. The ﬁnal section discusses
policy and regulatory concerns prompted by the growth of the OTC derivatives
market.
1. FORWARD RATE AGREEMENTS
FRAs are cash-settled forward contracts on interest rates traded among major
international banks active in the Eurodollar market. An FRA can be viewed as
the OTC equivalent of a Eurodollar futures contract. Most FRAs trade for ma-
turities corresponding to standard Eurodollar time deposit maturities, although
nonstandard maturities are sometimes traded (Grabbe 1991, Chap. 13). Trading
in FRAs began in 1983 (Norﬁeld 1992).
Banks use FRAs to ﬁx interest costs on anticipated future deposits or inter-
est revenues on variable-rate loans indexed to LIBOR. A bank that sells an FRA
agrees to pay the buyer the increased interest cost on some “notional” principal
amount if some speciﬁed maturity of LIBOR is above a stipulated “forward
rate” on the contract maturity or settlement date. The principal amount of the
agreement is termed “notional” because, while it determines the amount of the
payment, actual exchange of the principal never takes place. Conversely, the
buyer agrees to pay the seller any decrease in interest cost if market interest
rates fall below the forward rate. Thus, buying an FRA is comparable to selling,
or going short, a Eurodollar or LIBOR futures contract.
The following example illustrates the mechanics of a transaction involving
an FRA. Suppose two banks enter into an agreement specifying:
– a forward rate of 5 percent on a Eurodollar deposit with a three-month
maturity;      
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– a $1 million notional principal; and
– settlement in one month.
Such an agreement is termed a 1 × 4 FRA because it ﬁxes the interest rate
for a deposit to be placed after one month and maturing four months after the
date the contract is negotiated. If the three-month LIBOR is 6 percent on the
contract settlement date, the seller would owe the buyer the difference between
6 and 5 percent interest on $1 million for a period of 90 days. Every 1 basis
point change in the interest rate payable on a principal of $1 million for a 90-
day maturity changes interest cost by $25, so that the increase in the interest
cost on a three-month Eurodollar deposit over the speciﬁed forward rate in
this case is $25 × 100 basis points = $2,500. But the interest on a Eurodollar
deposit is paid upon maturity (at the end of the term of the deposit), whereas
FRAs are settled on the contract maturity date (which would correspond to the
date the underlying hypothetical deposit would be placed). Therefore, to make
the cash payment on the FRA equivalent to the extra interest that would have
been earned on a Eurodollar deposit paying 6 percent, the $2,500 difference in
interest costs calculated above is discounted back three months using the actual
three-month LIBOR prevailing on the settlement date. Thus, if 90-day LIBOR
turns out to be 6 percent on the contract maturity date the buyer would receive
$2,463.05 = $2,500/[1 + 0.06(90/360)].
More generally, ﬁnal settlement of the amounts owed by the parties to an






N = the notional principal amount of the agreement;
LIBOR = the value of LIBOR for the maturity speciﬁed by the contract
prevailing on the contract settlement date;
FR = the agreed-upon forward rate; and
dtm = maturity of the forward rate, speciﬁed in days.
If LIBOR > FR the seller owes the payment to the buyer, and if LIBOR < FR
the buyer owes the seller the absolute value of the payment amount determined
by the above formula.
2. INTEREST RATE SWAPS
A swap is a contractual agreement between two parties to exchange, or “swap,”
future payment streams based on differences in the returns to different securities
or changes in the price of some underlying item. Interest rate swaps constitute
the most common type of swap agreement. In an interest rate swap, the parties
to the agreement, termed the swap counterparties, agree to exchange payments       
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Source: Market Survey Highlights, Year End 1991, International Swap Dealers Association, Inc.
indexed to two different interest rates. Total payments are determined by the
speciﬁed notional principal amount of the swap, which is never actually ex-
changed. Financial intermediaries, such as banks, pension funds, and insurance
companies, as well as nonﬁnancial ﬁrms use interest rate swaps to effectively
change the maturity of outstanding debt or that of an interest-bearing asset.1
Swaps grew out of parallel loan agreements in which ﬁrms exchanged
loans denominated in different currencies. Although some swaps were arranged
in the late 1970s, the ﬁrst widely publicized swap took place in 1981 when
IBM and the World Bank agreed to exchange interest payments on debt de-
nominated in different currencies, an arrangement known as a currency swap.
The ﬁrst interest rate swap was a 1982 agreement in which the Student Loan
Marketing Association (Sallie Mae) swapped the interest payments on an issue
of intermediate-term, ﬁxed-rate debt for ﬂoating-rate payments indexed to the
three-month Treasury bill yield. The interest rate swap market has grown rapidly
since then. Figure 1 displays the year-end total notional principal of U.S. dollar
1 See Wall and Pringle (1988) for a more comprehensive survey of market participants.   
A. Kuprianov: OTC Interest 69
interest rate swaps outstanding from 1985 to 1991. Based on market survey data
published by the International Swap Dealers Association (ISDA), U.S. dollar in-
terest rate swaps comprise about one-half of all interest rate swaps outstanding:
the notional principal amount of U.S. dollar interest rate swaps outstanding as
of the end of 1991 was just over $1.5 trillion, compared to almost $3.1 trillion
for all interest rate swaps.
Swap Dealers
Early interest rate swaps were brokered transactions in which ﬁnancial in-
termediaries with customers interested in entering into a swap would seek
counterparties for the transaction among their other customers. The intermedi-
ary collected a brokerage fee as compensation, but did not maintain a continuing
role once the transaction was completed. The contract was between the two
ultimate swap users, who exchanged payments directly.
Today the market has evolved into more of a dealer market dominated
by large international commercial and investment banks. Dealers act as market
makers that stand ready to become a counterparty to different swap transactions
before a customer for the other side of the transaction is located. A swap dealer
intermediates cash ﬂows between different customers, or “end users,” becoming
a middleman to each transaction. The dealer market structure relieves end users
from the need to monitor the ﬁnancial condition of many different swap coun-
terparties. Because dealers act as middlemen, end users need only be concerned
with the ﬁnancial condition of the dealer, and not with the creditworthiness of
the other ultimate end user of the instrument (Brown and Smith 1990).
Figure 2 illustrates the ﬂow of payments between two swap end users
through a swap dealer. Unlike brokers, dealers in the over-the-counter market
do not charge a commission. Instead, they quote two-way “bid” and “asked”
prices at which they stand ready to act as counterparty to their customers in a
derivative instrument. The quoted spread between bid and asked prices allows
an intermediary to receive a higher payment from one counterparty than is paid
to the other.
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Swap Market Conventions
There are many different variants of interest rate swaps. The most common is
the ﬁxed/ﬂoating swap in which a ﬁxed-rate payer makes payments based on a
long-term interest rate to a ﬂoating-rate payer, who, in turn, makes payments in-
dexed to a short-term money market rate to the ﬁxed-rate payer. A ﬁxed/ﬂoating
swap is characterized by:
– a ﬁxed interest rate;
– a variable or ﬂoating interest rate which is periodically reset;
– a notional principal amount upon which total interest payments are based;
and
– the term of the agreement, including a schedule of interest rate reset dates
(that is, dates when the value of the interest rate used to determine
ﬂoating-rate payments is determined) and payment dates.
The ﬁxed interest rate typically is based on the prevailing market interest rate
for Treasury securities with a maturity corresponding to the term of the swap
agreement. The ﬂoating rate is most often indexed to three- or six-month LI-
BOR, in which case the swap is termed a “generic” or “plain vanilla” swap,
but can be indexed to almost any money market rate such as the Treasury
bill, commercial paper, federal funds, or prime interest rate. The maturity, or
“tenor,” of a ﬁxed/ﬂoating interest rate swap can vary between 1 and 15 years.
By convention, a ﬁxed-rate payer is designated as the buyer and is said to be
long the swap, while the ﬂoating-rate payer is the seller and is characterized
as short the swap.
Timing of Payments
A swap is negotiated on its “trade date” and takes effect two days later on its
initial “settlement date.” If the agreement requires the exchange of cash at the
outset, as in the case of a “nonpar” swap, the transaction takes place on the
initial settlement date. Interest begins accruing on the “effective date” of the
swap, which usually coincides with the initial settlement date. (Forward swaps,
in which the effective date of the swap is deferred, are an exception to this
rule.) Floating-rate payments are adjusted on periodic “reset dates” based on the
prevailing market-determined value of the ﬂoating-rate index, with subsequent
payments made on a sequence of payment dates (also known as settlement
dates) speciﬁed by the agreement. Typically, the reset frequency for the ﬂoating-
rate index is the term of the interest rate index itself. For example, the ﬂoating
rate on a generic swap indexed to the six-month LIBOR would, in most cases,
be reset every six months with payment dates following six months later. The
ﬂoating rate can be reset more frequently, however, as in the case of swaps
indexed to Treasury bill rates, which are reset weekly.     
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Fixed interest payment intervals can be three months, six months, or one
year. Semiannual payment intervals are most common because they coincide
with the intervals between interest payments on Treasury bonds. Floating-rate
payment intervals need not coincide with ﬁxed-rate payment intervals, although
they often do. When payment intervals coincide, it is common practice to ex-
change only the net difference between the ﬁxed and ﬂoating payments.
Price Quotation
The price of a ﬁxed/ﬂoating swap is quoted in two parts: a ﬁxed interest rate
and an index upon which the ﬂoating interest rate is based. The ﬂoating rate
can be based on an index of short-term market rates (such as a given maturity
of LIBOR) plus or minus a given margin, or set to the index “ﬂat”—that is, the
ﬂoating interest rate index itself with no margin added. The convention in the
swap market is to quote the ﬁxed interest rate as an All-In-Cost (AIC), which
means that the ﬁxed interest rate is quoted relative to a ﬂat ﬂoating-rate index.
The AIC typically is quoted as a spread over U.S. Treasury securities with
a maturity corresponding to the term of the swap. For example, a swap dealer
might quote a price on a three-year generic swap at an All-In-Cost of “72–76
ﬂat,” which means the dealer stands ready to “buy” the swap (that is, enter into
the swap as a ﬁxed-rate payer) at 72 basis points over the prevailing three-year
interest rate on U.S. Treasuries while receiving ﬂoating-rate payments indexed
to a speciﬁed maturity of LIBOR with no margin, and “sell” (receive ﬁxed and
pay ﬂoating) if the other party to the swap agrees to pay 76 basis points over
Treasury securities.
Bid-asked spreads in the swap market vary greatly depending on the type
of agreement. The spread can be as low as 3 to 4 basis points for a two- or
three-year generic swap, while spreads for nonstandard, custom-tailored swaps
tend to be much higher.
The Generic Swap
As an illustration of the mechanics of a simple interest rate swap, consider
the example of a generic swap. Fixed interest payments on a generic swap
typically are based on a 30/360 day-count convention, meaning that they are
calculated assuming each month has 30 days and the quoted interest rate is
based on a 360-day year. Given an All-In-Cost of the swap, the semiannual
ﬁxed-rate payment would be
(N)(AIC)(180/360),
where N denotes the notional principal amount of the agreement.
Floating-rate payments are based on an actual/360-day count, meaning
that interest payments are calculated using the actual number of days elapsed       
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since the previous payment date, based on a 360-day year. Let dt denote the
number of days since the last settlement date. Then, the ﬂoating-rate payment
is determined by the formula
(N)(LIBOR)(dt/360).
To illustrate, suppose a dealer quotes an All-In-Cost for a generic swap at
10 percent against six-month LIBOR ﬂat. If the notional principal amount of
the swap is $1 million, then the semiannual ﬁxed payment would be
$50,000 = ($1,000,000)(0.10)(180/360).
Suppose that the six-month period from the effective date of the swap to the
ﬁrst payment date (sometimes also termed a settlement date) comprises 181
days and that the corresponding LIBOR was 8 percent on the swap’s effective
date. Then, the ﬁrst ﬂoating-rate payment would be
$40,222.22 = ($1,000,000)(0.08)(181/360).
Often a swap agreement will call for only the net amount of the promised
payments to be exchanged. In this example, the ﬁxed-rate payer would pay the
ﬂoating-rate payer a net amount of
$9,777.78 = $50,000.00 − $40,222.22.
A payment frequency “mismatch” occurs when the ﬂoating-rate payment
frequency does not match the scheduled frequency of the ﬁxed-rate payment.
Mismatches typically arise in the case of swaps that base ﬂoating-rate payments
on maturities shorter than the six-month payment frequency common for ﬁxed-
rate payments. Macfarlane, Ross, and Showers (1990) discuss swap mismatches
in some detail.
Day-Count Conventions
A wide variety of day-count conventions are used in the swap market. Fixed
payments can be quoted either on an actual/365 (bond equivalent) basis or on
an actual/360 basis. Floating-rate payments indexed to private-sector interest
rates typically follow an actual/360 day-count convention commonly used in the
money market. Floating-rate payments tied to Treasury bill rates are calculated
on an actual/365 basis, however.
Nongeneric Swaps
An interest rate swap that speciﬁes an exchange of payments based on the
difference between two different variable rates is known as a “basis swap.”
For example, a basis swap might specify the exchange of payments based on
the difference between LIBOR and the prime rate. Other interest rate swaps
include the forward swap, in which the effective date of the swap is deferred;       
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the swaption, which is an option on an interest rate swap; and puttable and
callable swaps, in which one party has the right to cancel the swap at certain
times. This list is far from exhaustive—many other types of interest rate swaps
are currently traded, and the number grows with each year. Abken (1991b)
describes a variety of different swap agreements.
Swap Valuation
Interest rate swaps can be viewed as implicit mutual lending arrangements. A
party to an interest rate swap implicitly holds a long position in one type of
interest-bearing security and a short position in another. Swap valuation tech-
niques utilize this fact to reduce the problem of pricing an interest rate swap
to a straightforward problem of pricing two underlying hypothetical securities
having a redemption or face value equal to the notional principal amount of
the swap. The method used to value a ﬁxed/ﬂoating swap is outlined below.
Partitioning a Swap
A ﬁxed/ﬂoating swap can be partitioned into (1) a bond paying a ﬁxed coupon
and (2) a variable-rate note with payments tied to the variable-rate index. Let
S(0,T) denote the value of a T-period swap on its initial settlement date (date
0), B(0,T) the value of a hypothetical T-period ﬁxed-rate bond paying a coupon
equal to the ﬁxed-rate payments speciﬁed by the agreement, and V(0,T) the
value of a variable-rate note maturing at date T. Assuming that the face or
redemption value of both hypothetical securities is equal to the notional prin-
cipal amount of the swap, the value of the swap to a ﬁxed-rate payer can be
expressed as
S(0,T) = V(0,T) − B(0,T).
Pricing the Variable-Rate Note
A variable-rate note whose payments are indexed to market interest rates is
valued at par upon issuance and just after each interest payment is made. Thus,
assuming that payment dates coincide with interest rate reset dates, the value of
the hypothetical variable-rate note V(0,T) will just equal the notional principal
amount of the swap on every reset date. On any other date the value of a
variable-rate note—exclusive of accrued interest—is just the present value of
the next known interest payment plus the present value of the face value of the
note, the latter amount representing the value of all remaining payments on the
note as of the next settlement date.
Pricing the Fixed-Rate Note
The hypothetical ﬁxed-rate note B(0,T) can be priced using standard bond
valuation techniques. The convention in swap markets is to quote the AIC          
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as a semiannual bond-equivalent rate. The formula for valuing a bond paying




[(C/2)/(1 + y/2)t] + [N/(1 + y)T],
where C is the annual coupon payment, T the number of years to maturity, N
the principal or face value, and y the yield-to-maturity of the bond.
By deﬁnition, the All-In-Cost of a ﬁxed/ﬂoating swap is the yield to ma-
turity that just makes the value of the hypothetical ﬁxed-rate bond equal to the
notional principal amount of the swap. The annual coupon payment for this
hypothetical bond is determined by the AIC and the notional principal amount
of the agreement:
C = (AIC/100)(N),
where AIC is expressed as a percentage rate. It is easy to see that the value
of the hypothetical bond implicit in this ﬁxed/ﬂoating swap will be par (the
notional principal amount of the swap) when
y = AIC/100.
Nonpar Swaps
In most cases swaps are priced so that the initial value of the agreement is zero
to both counterparties; that is, so that the value of both hypothetical component
securities is just equal to the notional principal amount of the swap. Occasion-
ally, however, a swap may be priced such that one party owes money to the other
at initial settlement, resulting in a “nonpar” swap. Nonpar swaps are used to
offset existing positions in swaps entered into in previous periods where interest
rates have changed since the original swap was negotiated, or in cases where
a given cash ﬂow needs to be matched exactly (Dattatreya 1992). Valuation
methods for nonpar swaps are somewhat more involved than the simple case
discussed above. Interested readers can ﬁnd more comprehensive discussions
of swap valuation in Beckstrom (1990), Iben (1990), and Macfarlane, Ross,
and Showers (1990).
The Effect of Changes in Market Interest Rates on Swap Values
A change in market interest rates affects the value of a ﬁxed/ﬂoating swap
in much the same way that it affects the value of a corporate bond with a
comparable maturity. To see why, note that a change in market interest rates
will have no effect on the value of the hypothetical variable-rate note implicit
in a ﬁxed/ﬂoating swap on interest rate reset dates. Therefore, on reset dates a
change in market interest rates will affect the value of the swap only through
its effect on the value of the hypothetical ﬁxed-rate bond. Since an increase in   
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interest rates lowers the value of the bond, it increases the value of the swap
position for a ﬁxed-rate payer to the same degree it would increase the value
of a short position in a ﬁxed-rate bond.
Between interest rate reset dates the amount of the next payment due on
the variable-rate note is predetermined. Thus, a change in market interest rates
affects the values of both the hypothetical variable-rate note and the hypothet-
ical ﬁxed-rate bond. The change in the value of the variable-rate note partially
offsets the change in the value of the ﬁxed-rate note in this case. As a general
rule the price behavior of a ﬁxed/ﬂoating interest rate swap will approximate
the price behavior of a ﬁxed-rate note with a maturity equal to the term of the
swap less the maturity of the variable interest rate. For example, a two-year
generic swap indexed to six-month LIBOR will approximate the behavior of a
ﬁxed-rate bond with a term to maturity of between 18 and 24 months, depending
on the amount of time since the last interest rate reset date (Burghardt et al.
1991, p. 86).
The value of a ﬁxed/ﬂoating swap generally changes over time when the
term structure of interest rates is upward-sloping. Only when the term structure
is ﬂat and market interest rates remain unchanged will the value of an interest
rate swap remain unchanged over the life of the agreement (Smith, Smithson,
and Wakeman 1988).
3. INTEREST RATE CAPS
The buyer of an interest rate cap pays the seller a premium in return for the right
to receive the difference in the interest cost on some notional principal amount
any time a speciﬁed index of market interest rates rises above a stipulated “cap
rate.” The buyer bears no obligation or liability if interest rates fall below the
cap rate, however. Thus, a cap resembles an option in that it represents a right
rather than an obligation to the buyer.
Caps evolved from interest rate guarantees that ﬁxed a maximum level
of interest payable on ﬂoating-rate loans. The advent of trading in over-the-
counter interest rate caps dates back to 1985, when banks began to strip such
guarantees from ﬂoating-rate notes to sell to the market (Kahle 1992). The
leveraged buyout boom of the 1980s spurred the evolution of the market for
interest rate caps. Firms engaged in leveraged buyouts typically took on large
quantities of short-term debt, which made them vulnerable to ﬁnancial distress
in the event of a rise in interest rates. As a result, lenders began requiring
such borrowers to buy interest rate caps to reduce the risk of ﬁnancial distress
(Burghardt et al. 1991). More recently, trading activity in interest rate caps has
declined as the number of new leveraged buyouts has fallen. Figure 3 shows
that the total notional principal amount of caps, ﬂoors, and collars outstanding
at the end of 1991 actually fell to $311 billion from $360 billion at the end of     
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Year-End 1990 Year-End 1991
Source: Market Survey Highlights, Year End 1991, International Swap Dealers Association, Inc.
1990 (ﬂoors and collars are discussed below).
Market Conventions
An interest rate cap is characterized by:
– a notional principal amount upon which interest payments are based;
– an interest rate index, typically some speciﬁed maturity of LIBOR;
– a cap rate, which is equivalent to a strike or exercise price on an option;
and
– the period of the agreement, including payment dates and interest rate
reset dates.
Payment schedules for interest rate caps follow conventions in the interest
rate swap market. Payment amounts are determined by the value of the index
rate on a series of interest rate reset dates. Intervals between interest rate reset
dates and scheduled payment dates typically coincide with the term of the
interest rate index. Thus, interest rate reset dates for a cap indexed to six-
month LIBOR would occur every six months with payments due six months         
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later. Cap buyers typically schedule interest rate reset and payment intervals to
coincide with interest payments on outstanding variable-rate debt. Interest rate
caps cover periods ranging from one to ten years with interest rate reset and
payment dates most commonly set either three or six months apart.
If the speciﬁed market index is above the cap rate, the seller pays the buyer
the difference in interest cost on the next payment date. The amount of the
payment is determined by the formula
(N)max(0,r − rc)(dt/360),
where N is the notional principal amount of the agreement, rc is the cap rate
(expressed as a decimal), and dt is the number of days from the interest rate
reset date to the payment date. Interest rates quoted in cap agreements follow
money market day-count conventions, so that payment calculations assume a
360-day year.
Figure 4 depicts the payoff to the buyer of a one-period interest rate cap.
If the index rate is above the cap rate, the buyer receives a payment of (N)(r−
rc)(dt/360), which is equivalent to the payoff from buying an FRA.2 Otherwise,
the buyer receives no payment and loses the premium paid for the cap. Thus, a
cap effectively gives its buyer the right, but not the obligation, to buy an FRA
2 One difference between the payoff to an FRA and the payoff to an in-the-money cap is
that an FRA pays the present value of the change in interest payable on the notional principal at
settlement (which corresponds to the reset date of a cap), while payments on caps are deferred. The
value of the payment has the same present value in both cases, however, so that the comparison
between the payoff to a cap and a call option on an FRA remains accurate.          
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with a forward rate equal to the cap rate. Such an agreement is known as a call
option. A one-period cap can be viewed as a European call option on an FRA
with a strike price equal to the cap rate rc.3 More generally, multi-period caps,
which specify a series of future interest rate reset and payment dates, can be
viewed as a bundle of European call options on a sequence of FRAs.
Example of an Interest Rate Cap
Consider the example of a one-year interest rate cap that speciﬁes a notional
principal amount of $1 million and a six-month LIBOR cap rate of 5 percent.
Assume the agreement covers a period starting January 15 through the following
January 15 with the interest rate to be reset on July 15. The ﬁrst period of a cap
agreement typically is excluded from the agreement, so the cap buyer in this
example will be entitled to a payment only if the six-month LIBOR exceeds 5
percent on the July 15 interest rate reset date. Suppose that six-month LIBOR
is 5.5 percent on July 15. Then, on the following January 15 (184 days after
the July 15 reset date) the seller will owe the buyer
$2,555.56 = ($1,000,000)(0.055 − 0.050)(184/360).
Comparison of Caps and Futures Options
A one-period cap can be compared to a put option on a Eurodollar futures
contract. To see why, note that the payoff at expiration to a put option on
Eurodollar futures is
(N)max(0,K − F)(90/360),
where N is the notional principal amount of the agreement ($1 million for a
Eurodollar futures option), K is the strike price and F is the price of the
underlying futures contract. The price index used for Eurodollar futures can
be written as F = 100 − r, where r is the three-month LIBOR implied by the
futures price. Now, write K = 100 − rk, where rk is the futures interest rate
implied by the strike price K. Then, the payoff at expiration to a Eurodollar
futures option can be expressed as
(N)max[0,100 − rk − (100 − r)](90/360) = (N)max(0,r − rk)(90/360).
The right-hand side of this expression is just the payoff to a one-period interest
rate cap indexed to three-month LIBOR with a cap of rk.
Despite the similarities between the caps and Eurodollar futures options,
the two instruments differ in a number of noteworthy respects. First, futures
3 A European option can be exercised only on its expiration date. Similarly, a cap buyer can
only “exercise” his option if the index rate is above the cap rate on the interest rate reset date,
so that the interest rate reset date corresponds to the expiration date on a European-style option.   
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options are standardized, exchange-traded instruments, whereas caps are over-
the-counter instruments whose payments can be tailored to match the payment
schedule of any variable-rate loan. Eurodollar futures options are based on
three-month LIBOR, whereas caps can be bought over the counter to match
virtually any maturity interest rate up to one year. Second, futures options are
American-style options that can be exercised at any time before the expiration
date. In contrast, caps resemble a strip of European options—a cap can be
“exercised” only if the speciﬁed index rate is above the cap rate on a given
reset date. Third, Eurodollar futures options are cash settled on the option
expiration date, while a cap is settled in arrears—that is, the payment period
falls some time after the interest rate reset date.
Hedging Uses of Caps
Figure 5 illustrates the effect that buying a cap has on the interest expense
associated with a ﬂoating-rate loan. The ﬁrst panel depicts the unhedged or
inherent exposure of a ﬁrm with a loan tied to six-month LIBOR. The ﬁrm is
exposed to the risk that market interest rates will rise before the next interest
rate reset date on the loan and drive up its interest costs. The second panel
illustrates the effect that buying a cap has on interest expense. If interest rates
rise above the 5 percent cap rate, the payment received from the cap seller
offsets the ﬁrm’s increased interest expense. The hedged position, illustrated in
the third panel, shows how buying a cap limits the ﬁrm’s interest expense to a
maximum amount determined by the cost of servicing the debt at the cap rate
plus the premium paid for the instrument.       
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4. INTEREST RATE FLOORS
The buyer of an interest rate ﬂoor pays the seller a premium in return for
the right to receive the difference in interest payable on a notional principal
amount when a speciﬁed index interest rate falls below a stipulated minimum,
or “ﬂoor rate.” Buyers use ﬂoors to ﬁx a minimum interest rate on an asset
paying a variable interest rate indexed to some maturity of LIBOR. Like an
interest rate cap, a ﬂoor is an option-like agreement in that it represents a right
rather than an obligation to the buyer. The buyer of an interest rate ﬂoor incurs
no obligation if the index interest rate rises above the ﬂoor rate, so the most a
buyer can lose is the premium paid to the seller at the outset of the agreement.
The payment received by the buyer of an interest rate ﬂoor is determined
by the formula
(N)max(0,rf − r)(dt/360),
where N is the notional principal amount of the agreement, rf is the ﬂoor rate
or strike price, and dt is the number of days from the last interest rate reset
date to the payment date. Figure 6 depicts the payoff to a one-period ﬂoor as
a function of the value of the underlying index rate. If the index rate is below
the ﬂoor rate on the interest rate reset date the buyer receives a payment of
(N)(rf −r)(dt/360), which is equivalent to the payoff from selling an FRA at a
forward rate of rf. On the other hand, if the index rate is above the ﬂoor rate
the buyer receives no payment and loses the premium paid to the seller. Thus,
a ﬂoor effectively gives the buyer the right, but not the obligation, to sell an
FRA, which makes it equivalent to a European put option on an FRA. More        
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generally, a multi-period ﬂoor can be viewed as a bundle of European-style put
options on a sequence of FRAs maturing on a succession of future maturity
dates.
Comparison of Floors and Futures Options
Purchasing a one-period interest rate ﬂoor yields a payoff closely resembling
that of a long Eurodollar futures call option. The payoff to a call option on a
Eurodollar futures contract is
(N)max(0,F − K)(90/360),
where F = 100−r is the index price of the underlying futures contract and K is
the strike price. As before, write K = 100−rk. Then, the payoff to a Eurodollar
futures call option can be expressed in terms of the underlying interest rate as
(N)max(0,rk − r)(90/360),
which is the same as the payoff to a one-period interest rate ﬂoor indexed to
90-day LIBOR with a ﬂoor rate equal to rk. The one noteworthy difference
between the two instruments is that a Eurodollar futures option can be exer-
cised at any time, while a ﬂoor resembles a European option that can only be
exercised on its expiration date. Like caps, interest rate ﬂoors settle in arrears,
whereas a futures option settles on its expiration date.
5. INTEREST RATE COLLARS
The buyer of an interest rate collar purchases an interest rate cap while selling a
ﬂoor indexed to the same interest rate. Borrowers with variable-rate loans buy
collars to limit effective borrowing rates to a range of interest rates between
some maximum, determined by the cap rate, and a minimum, which is ﬁxed by
the ﬂoor strike price; hence, the term “collar.” Although buying a collar limits a
borrower’s ability to beneﬁt from a signiﬁcant decline in market interest rates,
it has the advantage of being less expensive than buying a cap alone because
the borrower earns premium income from the sale of the ﬂoor that offsets the
cost of the cap. A zero-cost collar results when the premium earned by selling
a ﬂoor exactly offsets the cap premium.
The amount of the payment due to or owed by a buyer of an interest rate
collar is determined by the expression
(N)[max(0,r − rc) − max(0,rf − r)](dt/360),
where, as before, N is the notional principal amount of the agreement, rc is
the cap rate, rf is the ﬂoor rate, and dt is the term of the index in days. Figure      
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b. Sell Floor c. Buy Collar
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b. Sell Floor c. Buy FRA
7 illustrates the payoff to buying a one-period zero-cost interest rate collar. If
the index interest rate r is less than the ﬂoor rate rf on the interest rate reset
date, the ﬂoor is in-the-money and the collar buyer (who has sold a ﬂoor) must
pay the collar counterparty an amount equal to (N)(rf − r)(dt/360). When r is
greater than rf but less than the cap rate rc, both the ﬂoor and the cap are out-
of-the-money and no payments are exchanged. Finally, when the index is above
the cap rate the cap is in-the-money and the buyer receives (N)(r−rc)(dt/360).
Figure 8 illustrates a special case of a zero-cost collar that results from the
simultaneous purchase of a one-period cap and sale of a one-period ﬂoor when
the cap and ﬂoor rates are equal. In this case the combined transaction replicates   
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Figure 9 The Effect of Buying an Interest Rate Collar on
Interest Expense
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the payoff of an FRA with a forward interest rate equal to the cap/ﬂoor rate.
This result is a consequence of a property of option prices known as put-call
parity.
More generally, the purchase of a cap and sale of a ﬂoor with the same
notional principle, index rate, strike price, and reset dates produces the same
payout stream as an interest rate swap with an All-In-Cost equal to the cap or
ﬂoor rate. Since caps and ﬂoors can be viewed as a sequence of European call
and put options on FRAs, buying a cap and selling a ﬂoor with the same strike
price and interest rate reset and payment dates effectively creates a sequence
of FRAs, all with the same forward rate. But note that an interest rate swap
can be viewed as a sequence of FRAs, each with a forward rate equal to the
All-In-Cost of the swap. Therefore, put-call parity implies that buying a cap
and selling a ﬂoor with the same contract speciﬁcations results in the same
payment stream that would be obtained by buying an interest rate swap.
In recent years dealers in the OTC derivatives market have shown a great
deal of ingenuity in devising new hybrid instruments yielding an almost endless
variety of payout patterns. Interested readers can ﬁnd descriptions of other types
of derivatives in Abken (1989), Burghardt et al. (1991), Smith and Smithson
(1990), and Smith, Smithson, and Wilford (1989).
Hedging Uses of Interest Rate Collars
Figure 9 illustrates the effect that buying a one-period, zero-cost collar has on
the exposure to changes in market interest rates faced by a ﬁrm with outstand-
ing variable-rate debt. The ﬁrst panel depicts the ﬁrm’s inherent or unhedged
interest exposure, while the second panel illustrates the effect that buying a        
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collar has on interest expense. Finally, the third panel combines the borrower’s
inherent exposure with the payoff to buying a collar to display the effect of a
change in market interest rates on a hedged borrower’s interest expense. Note
that changes in market interest rates can only affect the hedged borrower’s
interest expense when the index rate varies between the ﬂoor and cap rates.
Outside this range, the borrower’s interest expense is completely hedged.
6. RISK AND REGULATION IN THE
OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES MARKET
Regulatory Concerns
The OTC derivatives market is often characterized as unregulated because no
federal regulatory agency oversees trading activity in this market, as the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) does with futures markets or the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) does with securities markets.4
Yet it would be misleading to characterize the OTC derivatives market as
completely unregulated. Many of the largest derivatives dealers are afﬁliates
of commercial banks, which rank among the most heavily regulated of all
ﬁrms. Bank regulatory agencies routinely conduct on-site examinations to re-
view procedures in place for controlling risks at the institutions they supervise.
Additionally, regulations imposed by the federal banking agencies include min-
imum capital requirements designed to take account of credit risk exposure
arising in connection with derivative instruments.5 While not subject to the
comprehensive regulatory oversight applied to commercial banks, investment
banks dealing in OTC derivatives are subject to SEC scrutiny. And the Inter-
national Swap Dealers Association (ISDA)—an industry association organized
by the major OTC derivatives dealers—sets standards for market practices and
addresses the legal and public policy issues affecting the market.
Nonetheless, the rapid growth and sheer size of the OTC derivatives market
has sparked debate over the risks posed by the growth of trading in derivative
instruments and the appropriate scope of market regulation.6 When all types of
derivative agreements are taken into account, including currency swaps, caps,
ﬂoors, collars, and swaptions, the total notional principal amount of outstanding
agreements exceeded $4 trillion at the end of 1991, with derivatives dealers
acting as middlemen to most transactions. Much of the trading activity in
this market takes place between a relatively small number of large dealers,
resulting in an interdependent web of obligations among those dealers.7 Unlike
4 See Abken (1991a) for a description of these other markets.
5 Rogers (1990) discusses capital requirements for OTC derivatives.
6 For example, see Corrigan (1992), Bank for International Settlements (1992), and Hansell
and Muehring (1992).
7 Data in ISDA’s Market Survey Highlights, Second Half 1991, indicates that 47 percent of
all new interest rate swaps arranged in 1991 were between ISDA member organizations.    
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exchange-traded derivatives such as futures contracts and futures options, where
the exchange clearinghouses guarantee contract performance through a system
of margin requirements, daily settlement of gains and losses, and the backing of
the capital of clearing member ﬁrms, OTC derivative instruments are bilateral
arrangements that carry no independent third-party guarantee. As a result, coun-
terparties to OTC instruments face the risk of default, known as counterparty
credit risk. Moreover, the absence of contract standardization means that OTC
derivatives tend to be less liquid than exchange-traded derivatives, which can
make it difﬁcult to execute transactions in periods of extreme price volatility
or when a counterparty’s credit standing is questioned.
A recent joint study by the three federal banking agencies examined the
risks posed by the growth of trading in OTC derivatives (Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and
Ofﬁce of the Comptroller of the Currency 1993). The study found that risks
associated with OTC derivatives differed little from the risks traditionally borne
by ﬁnancial intermediaries. Although it did identify a number of concerns, the
study concluded that trading in derivative instruments has not contributed to
the overall fragility of the ﬁnancial system and does not pose undue risks
for organizations active in this market. To the contrary, it cited at least one
instance—namely, the period of exchange rate turbulence in European curren-
cies in September of 1992—where it concluded that foreign currency markets
were not likely to have performed as well as they did during the crisis without
the existence of foreign currency derivatives that enabled ﬁnancial institutions
to manage their currency positions.
The joint study identiﬁed six different types of risks in connection with
derivative instruments: credit risk, market risk, liquidity risk, settlement risk,
operating risk, and aggregation risk. As noted earlier, much of the concern over
the growth of the market has centered around the issue of counterparty credit
risk because of the sheer size of the market and the size of credit exposures
borne by dealers. Because derivative instruments tie together so many different
markets around the world, regulators have expressed concerns that aggregation,
or interconnection risk, might make it difﬁcult to contain a ﬁnancial crisis to
keep it from spreading to other markets. The remainder of this article discusses
some of the risks associated with OTC derivatives and the legal, regulatory,
and market arrangements that have developed to deal with such risks.
Counterparty Credit Risk
Measuring the Credit Risk Exposure of an FRA
The credit risk exposure associated with an FRA, or any other derivative in-
strument for that matter, differs from that of a debt instrument because an FRA
is not a funding transaction and therefore involves no exchange of principal.
At its inception the value of an FRA is zero to both parties, so there is no
initial credit risk. Potential credit risk is bilateral: a party to an FRA is exposed     
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to credit risk when the value of the agreement becomes positive to him or
her, and the value of an FRA can change so as to gain value to either party.
Unlike a loan agreement, where ﬁnancial distress on the part of a borrower
always exposes the lender to default risk, ﬁnancial distress on the part of an
FRA counterparty does not necessarily expose the other counterparty to the
risk of default. A ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrm has no incentive to default on an
agreement that has positive value to it—and even if such a counterparty were
to default, the nondefaulting party would suffer no loss.
Since an FRA involves no exchange of principal, potential credit risk ex-
posure is a small fraction of the notional principal amount of the agreement.
Credit risk exposure is determined by the value of the FRA, which corresponds
to the cost of replacing the FRA. To illustrate, recall the earlier example of
a1× 4 FRA with a notional principal of $1 million and a forward rate of 5
percent. If market interest rates rise by 50 basis points immediately after the
agreement is negotiated, the value of the FRA to the buyer is just the current
present value of $1,250 (50 basis points × $25 per basis point), or
$1,229.51 = $1,250/[1 + 0.050(120/360)].
This calculation determines the value of the agreement exactly 30 days before
its scheduled settlement, or maturity date. The credit risk exposure borne by
the FRA buyer in this example is just over 1/10 of 1 percent of the notional
principal amount of the agreement.
Measuring the Credit Risk Exposure of an Interest Rate Swap
A swap counterparty’s credit risk exposure is determined by the cost of replac-
ing the agreement in the event of a default. The cost of obtaining a replacement
swap is determined by the difference between the All-In-Cost of the old swap
and the AIC on a replacement swap. As an illustration, consider the case of a
ﬁxed-rate payer in a swap with one year left to maturity and a 7 percent AIC. If
the ﬂoating-rate payer defaults when the prevailing market rate on a one-year
replacement swap is 8 percent, the nondefaulting party will be required to pay
an extra 1 percent per year on the notional principal to replace the swap. The
replacement value of the swap is just the net present value of the difference in
interest payments.
In discussing swap valuation methods it was useful to view a swap as
an implicit mutual lending arrangement in which the counterparties exchanged
loans indexed to two different interest rates. In looking at credit risk exposure,
however, it can be useful to view a swap as a bundle of FRAs, all with forward
rates equal to the All-In-Cost of the swap. Thus, the swap in the above example
can be viewed as a combination of a 0×6 FRA and a 6×12 FRA, each with a
forward rate of 7 percent. The replacement cost of the swap is just equal to the
value of the two component FRAs when the underlying index rate is 8 percent.    
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As with FRAs, the potential credit risk exposure of an interest rate swap
typically is a small fraction of the notional principal amount of the agreement.
By one estimate, the expected lifetime credit exposure associated with an in-
terest rate swap varies from 0.002 percent of the notional principal for a swap
with a one-year maturity to 4.5 percent for a swap with a ten-year maturity
(Simons 1989).
Credit Risk Exposure of Caps, Floors, and Collars
Sellers of caps and ﬂoors face no credit risk, since neither type of agreement
requires the buyer to make any payments other than the initial premium. But
cap and ﬂoor buyers face the risk of nonperformance on the part of the seller
any time a cap or ﬂoor goes “in-the-money”—that is, any time the seller is
required to make payments to the buyer. Since a collar involves a short position
in a ﬂoor and a long position in a cap, it can expose both the buyer and seller
to counterparty credit risk.
The credit risk exposure faced by the buyer of an interest rate cap can be
compared to the risk exposure of a ﬁxed-rate payer in an interest rate swap. In
both cases, the buyers face the risk that the seller will default when interest rates
rise. Similarly, the buyer of an interest rate ﬂoor faces a credit risk exposure
analogous to that of a ﬂoating-rate payer, or seller, of an interest rate swap.
The total credit risk exposure in each case is determined by the cost of buying
a replacement cap or ﬂoor.
Netting Arrangements
When dealers ﬁrst began acting as intermediaries in swap agreements the risk
associated with each swap was accounted for separately. As the market grew,
swap dealers found themselves parties to multiple agreements with the same
counterparty. Concern over their growing aggregate exposure led many dealers
to adopt “master” agreements that treated all their transactions with a given
counterparty as supplements to a single consolidated agreement. These master
agreements gave swap counterparties the right to terminate all supplemental
swap agreements in the event of default on any one of the swaps. The advent
of the master agreement represented an attempt by swap dealers to limit the
credit risk exposure with any single counterparty to the net value of all swaps
with that counterparty. Today virtually all OTC derivatives utilize a standard-
ized master agreement designed by the International Swap Dealers Association
(Gooch and Pergam 1990).
The Status of OTC Derivatives Under Bankruptcy Law
Before the enactment of recent amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, there was
some question as to whether master swap agreement netting provisions would      
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be legally enforceable in the event of bankruptcy. The U.S. Bankruptcy Code
grants a ﬁrm in bankruptcy proceedings an “automatic stay” from the claims of
its creditors. The automatic stay allows a bankrupt ﬁrm to postpone scheduled
debt payments and overrides most other contractual obligations pending the
resolution of all claims against the ﬁrm. Thus, although virtually all lending
agreements give creditors the right to demand accelerated repayment of a loan
in the event of a default on a scheduled payment, default inevitably delays
repayment in practice. Often, creditors of the bankrupt ﬁrm receive only a
fraction of the amounts owed them even if the ﬁrm ultimately emerges from
bankruptcy proceedings as a reorganized entity. Swap market participants faced
the risk that the Bankruptcy Courts might enforce the automatic stay against
swap agreements, making the netting provisions of the ISDA master swap
agreement unenforceable. Nondefaulting counterparties would then face the
risk that a bankruptcy trustee might selectively default only on swaps having a
negative value to a bankrupt counterparty, a practice known as “cherry picking.”
Public Law 101–311, enacted on June 25, 1990, amended the Bankruptcy
Code to exempt swap agreements executed under a single master agreement
such as the ISDA master agreement from the automatic stay normally applica-
ble to creditors of a bankrupt ﬁrm. The amendments were enacted to make the
netting provisions of the ISDA master swap agreement enforceable in the event
of bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Code amendments also authorize nondefaulting
swap counterparties to utilize any collateral posted in connection with a swap
agreement to offset the net amount owed by a bankrupt counterparty (Rogers
1990). In this respect, the law treats OTC derivatives analogously to exchange-
traded futures contracts.8 These provisions greatly mitigate the potential loss
faced by swap counterparties when the parties involved have multiple agree-
ments with one another.
The Status of Swap Agreements Under Banking Law
Commercial banks and thrift institutions are not subject to the provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code. Instead, bank failure resolution is governed by federal
and state banking laws, which gives the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) and the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) (in the case of certain
savings and loan institutions) considerable discretion in dealing with failing
federally insured depository institutions. The FDIC and RTC may act in the
capacity of either a conservator or a receiver. An institution placed in con-
servatorship is not declared legally insolvent. It continues its normal business
operations under the close scrutiny of federal regulators pending resolution of
8 Williams (1986) stresses the importance of the exemption of futures margin requirements
from the automatic stay as a prime reason for the existence of futures markets.     
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its ﬁnancial difﬁculties. Institutions in conservatorship are either returned to
private sector control, through a sale or merger, or they are eventually declared
insolvent. When a federally insured depository institution is declared legally
insolvent either the FDIC or RTC becomes the receiver for the institution. Reg-
ulators may resolve bank failures either through a “purchase and assumption”
transaction in which the failed institution is taken over by another bank or thrift
or, less often, through liquidation.9
The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989 (FIRREA) contains provisions similar to the netting provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code requiring the receiver of a failed bank or conservator of
a failing bank to treat all supplemental swap agreements executed under a
single master agreement as a single contract. In the event of a default or
liquidation of a bank or thrift, the institution’s counterparties maintain the
right to accelerate repayment of all swap agreements made under a single
master agreement. Counterparties do not have an automatic right to terminate
existing swap agreements when an institution is placed into conservatorship,
however, because an institution in conservatorship has not legally failed (al-
though they do retain the right to demand accelerated repayment in the event
of a default or breach of another covenant). FIRREA gives bank regulators
the express right to transfer all derivative instruments covered by a single
master agreement, along with other bank assets, to another institution, either
when the institution is in conservatorship or in the case of a purchase and
assumption transaction. But in this latter case the master agreement and all
its supplements must be treated as a single agreement and transferred together
with all applicable collateral. Thus, the law discourages federal regulators from
cherry picking among individual OTC agreements that are part of a larger
master agreement.10 Nondefaulting counterparties still face the risk that their
agreements might be assigned to a counterparty with a relatively weak credit
standing, however.
Although recent legislation has reduced the legal risks faced by domestic
counterparties, derivatives dealers with exposures to counterparties outside of
the United States still face risks arising from the uncertain legal status of
netting arrangements under foreign laws. At present, ISDA is working with
authorities in other countries to enact bankruptcy legislation resembling the
recent Bankruptcy Code amendments enacted in the United States. Until such
legislation is enacted, however, internationally active OTC derivatives dealers
face considerable legal risk.
9 Dotsey and Kuprianov (1990) describe bank failure resolution policies in more detail.
10 See Gooch and Pergam (1990) and Rogers (1990) for more details on banking law and
netting arrangements.   
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Aggregation or Interconnection Risk
Aggregation or interconnection risk refers to the risk that a disruption in one
market, caused by the default of a major institution or some other event, might
cause widespread difﬁculties throughout the OTC derivatives market or even
spread to other ﬁnancial markets. Market liquidity risk is one source of in-
terconnection risk. OTC derivatives dealers operate in many different markets
at once. They must often execute complex, multi-legged transactions to create
custom-tailored instruments for their customers while attempting to hedge the
resulting exposure to market risk. The successful execution of such operations
depends on the ability to complete a number of transactions in different mar-
kets almost simultaneously. But experience shows that market liquidity can
evaporate quickly, especially in times of ﬁnancial stress when market partici-
pants have reason to question the creditworthiness of potential counterparties.
Reduced liquidity can make it difﬁcult for a dealer to hedge its exposure to
market price risk or, in the event of a default by a counterparty, make obtaining
a replacement swap a costly proposition.
Counterparty credit risk can also be a source of aggregation risk because
such a large fraction of trading in OTC derivatives takes place between the deal-
ers themselves. The default of a single major dealer could have a signiﬁcant ef-
fect on the outstanding positions of other major dealers. In addition to potential
losses from credit risk exposures, a default by a major derivatives dealer would
leave other dealers exposed to considerable price risk. Dealers use derivatives
both to hedge their outstanding commitments to other OTC counterparties as
well as other asset holdings. These dealers would need to rebalance their port-
folios, either by buying or selling new derivative instruments or by quickly
selling existing asset holdings. The resulting ﬂurry of activity might conceiv-
ably disrupt not only the OTC derivatives market, but other markets as well.
To date, losses incurred by counterparties to OTC derivatives have yet to
even approach the magnitude of losses incurred in the course of more tradi-
tional lending and investment activities. Worth noting in this regard is that
ﬁnancial markets have survived at least one default by a major derivatives
dealer—that of Drexel Burnham Lambert in 1990—without serious disruption,
although it has certainly provided headaches for Drexel’s former counterparties.
Recent legislation recognizing netting arrangements was designed to help con-
tain the consequences of a default by a major derivatives dealer in the United
States, although, as noted earlier, other countries have been slow to enact such
legislation.
Market Arrangements for Controlling Risks
Managing the credit risk associated with a position in an instrument such as
an interest rate swap requires credit evaluation skills of the type commonly
associated with bank lending. Thus, as the swaps market evolved into a dealer      
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market where ﬁnancial intermediaries assumed the role of counterparty to the
end users of swap agreements, commercial banks, which have traditionally
specialized in credit risk evaluation and have the capital reserves necessary
to support credit risk management, came to dominate the market for swaps
and other OTC derivatives. Only in cases where a counterparty is deemed a
poor credit risk are performance bonds, such as margin requirements of the
type employed by futures exchanges, used to substitute for credit evaluation.
When performance bonds are used, the agreement often provides for the pe-
riodic settlement of changes in the value of a derivative instrument using a
process resembling the daily marking-to-market of futures contracts, although
settlement generally takes place at less frequent intervals with OTC derivatives
(Smith, Smithson, and Wakeman 1986).
The widely publicized ﬁnancial difﬁculties of many ﬁrms and banks in
recent years has made market participants sensitive to the issue of counterparty
credit risk. As a result, dealers with less than AA credit ratings have found it
increasingly difﬁcult to trade in OTC derivatives. The heavy loan losses and
resulting ﬁnancial difﬁculty experienced by many commercial banks in recent
years has hampered the ability of such institutions to compete in this market. At
the same time, a number of investment banks have formed separately capital-
ized subsidiaries so as to enhance their credit standing and remain competitive
in the derivatives market.11 Thus, market discipline has had the salutary effect
of restricting the activities of less creditworthy counterparties.
7. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The evolution of the over-the-counter derivatives market has revolutionized
the nature of ﬁnancial intermediation in money markets in a span covering
a little more than a decade. Along with the beneﬁts derivatives offer ﬁrms
in managing cash ﬂows, however, the rapid growth of the market has raised
new concerns for regulators and policymakers. Industry spokesmen argue that
existing market arrangements are adequate to address such concerns, a view
increasingly shared by regulators and policymakers.12 The development of the
ISDA master agreement in recent years, along with recent changes in banking
laws and in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, has gone far to minimize the potential
for widespread market disruption that could result from a default on the part
of a major dealer in the swaps market. And concerns about counterparty credit
risk have led market participants themselves to limit the activities of dealers
with less than outstanding credit ratings.
11 Federal regulators have yet to grant commercial banks approval to form separately capi-
talized subsidiaries of the type investment banks have begun to use. See Chew (1992, 1993) and
Peltz (1993) for a more detailed discussion of this trend.
12 For example, see Hansell and Muehring (1992), Phillips (1992), and Shale (1993).    
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